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Land values have risen significantly in real terms in England over the last two decades (Figure 1) with much debate about taxing the resultant ‘unearned increments’ that accrue to landowners; something that has global importance as governments face increasing financial constraints and seek new sources of revenue (Calavita & Mallach, 2010; Ingram & Hong, 2012).  The core concern is that, because these increments are unearned, often arising from public investment in infrastructure and planning permission, it is inequitable that landowners should take the benefits and appropriate that government should, at the least, share them.  This is reinforced by a general understanding that, in principle, such taxation does not reduce efficiency. Commentators regularly question why the current system of land value capture is inadequate and what could be done to generate a better approach (Aubrey, 2018; Barker, 2014; Civitas, 2018; House of Commons, 2018; Ryan-Collins et al, 2017; Shelter 2017).
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The UK’s experience of directly capturing land value increases is mainly limited to two approaches: taxing development value (defined as the increase in land value that generally follows planning permission) through un-hypothecated national taxation and achieving similar objectives by negotiated local levies, including planning obligations and the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) funding local infrastructure and affordable housing (Crook et al, 2016). There have been no comparable mechanisms for taxing the increases that flow to existing developments from new infrastructure and other improvements and few for taxing the benefits that all landowners receive because of the impact of increased economic activity and general prosperity on land values​[1]​.  There has thus been inconsistent tax treatment between land that is given planning permission and other land which benefits from increased land values but which is not taxed (Grant, 1992). 

This paper addresses the question of what principles should underpin the taxation of development values; why what looks easy in principle has turned out to be so difficult in practice; and what might be done to ensure a more effective approach. First, it examines the causes of increases in land values, and in particular the role that development values play.  It then goes on to discuss the criteria by which any measure of taxation should be assessed: promoting greater efficiency in land allocation, achieving more equitable outcomes and complying with general tax principles. It then turns to practicalities. It examines the different ways development values have been taxed in the UK and how far national taxation and local levy approaches have matched the criteria earlier identified.  The paper concludes by considering how to improve these instruments to generate more efficient and equitable outcomes – and whether they should be supplemented or replaced by more fundamental reforms covering all land value increases. 

2.	What causes increases in land and development values

Land has no intrinsic monetary value: its value depends on its use.  Land value is the residual from the income generated by the highest-value use of a site, less all the costs of generating that income, including required profit.  A site’s value is determined by competition between its various potential users.  Its ultimate use is determined, subject to regulatory control, by the highest value potential user. Development value is the increase in land value that arises from this development, compared with the existing value.

The land value of a particular site increases for several reasons. These include, on the demand side:

(a)	changes in overall property and land values arising from increased economic activity and prosperity, generating additional demand for land and therefore higher land prices;
(b)	 increases in demand for land arising from the benefits of infrastructure investment broadly defined e.g. greater accessibility and the resultant changes in opportunities and therefore again higher prices; and 
(c)	increased development values arising when planning consent enables higher-value opportunities to be realised from change of use but also site specific benefits resulting from (a) and (b) above. 
If additional land could be readily provided to enable this increased demand to be realised, the effect on land values would be limited.  The increases in land values therefore come from the incapacity of land with similar attributes, such as accessibility, to come forward at constant cost. 

The supply of developable land is limited by these fundamental factors but also by other important constraints, notably planning regulations, which modify the potential use of land and the mix of dwelling types. Landowners also hold land off the market for owner-specific reasons and because they expect prices to rise further in the future. Taking all these factors into account, the lower the price elasticity of supply, the higher will be the development values. 

Development values crystallise at the point when planning permission is granted. Planning permission enables a different, higher valued use, which takes account of expectations of economic growth, the value of existing infrastructure and the probability of further relevant improvements as well as the actual permission to change use. In the uncertain world of a discretionary planning system it may also be affected by the probability of adjustments to the planning permission itself.

Because the way local authorities operate the planning system varies, the land price effects will similarly vary (Bramley, 2003; Cheshire et al, 2014; Evans, 2004; Gerald Eve, 1992; Hilber & Vermeulen, 2010, 2016; Monk et al, 1996; Monk & Whitehead, 1999; Whitehead & Monk, 2004).  In particular, the tighter the constraints are drawn in areas of high demand for housing the greater will be the development values arising from granting planning permission and thus the tax revenue that could be generated without affecting the use of the land.  

3.	How should we tax land value increases? - Efficiency, Equity and Taxation Principles

Land taxation debates have a long history in planning, especially in the context of taxing development value arising from planning consent (Crook et al, 2016; Cullingworth, 1980). Debates have mainly concentrated on practical issues including:  (i) how much development value is available to tax once the issues around valuation, incentives to make land available, interaction with other taxes, uncertainty around the economic environment and other factors are taken into account; (ii) how much is it acceptable to tax, given attitudes to ‘unearned increments’ and private property rights; and (iii) what the revenues might be used for if they are to be hypothecated for local infrastructure investment. 





Efficiency issues have rarely been debated, because the assumption is made that land taxation will not distort resource decisions as long as the tax lies within the development value envelope. However broader based analyses address the probability that there will always be alternative uses and thus distortions and that (i) good planning decisions and well-structured taxation can increase the social value of land and particularly reduce negative externalities arising from inappropriate land uses, while (ii) poor decisions and taxes can increase costs or reduce values generating inefficiencies. 

The biggest issue with respect to the efficiency of land taxation is whether a tax will reduce land made available for development. The simplest models of land taxation (starting from Henry George, 1879) assume that land is homogeneous, its total amount is fixed and that all land will be taxed at the same rate. If that is the case the price of land is demand determined by the highest valued use and any tax will simply have to be absorbed by the landowner. The same applies to taxing increases in land values. 

However, this model bears no relation to the real world. As only a small part of total land is actually developed, more land can be made available as prices increase and land can be taken out of development if taxation makes it unprofitable. More importantly land has very different attributes and therefore the highest value productive use differs between plots – so planning and taxation will modify both the total amount of land made available and the allocation of land to different uses. In the context of taxing development value, it is imperative that the tax levied is less than the development value if distortions are not to be introduced. Given the many uncertainties associated with planning and development this may imply that the tax may have to be considerably less than the increase in value to limit efficiency loses (Crook, et al, 2016). 





In part because of the belief in the Henry George model, equity has often played a much larger role in debate than efficiency. Debates on equity underpinning public policy have tended to discuss either philosophical justifications for different conceptions of fairness or the practical consequences of these different conceptions for resource allocation (Wolff, 2008).  Despite equity being central to planning objectives, planners have been more preoccupied with process than distributional outcomes (Campbell, 2010; Fainstein 2010).  Exceptions are planning debates about land taxation which have concentrated on the long standing views that development value arises from ‘no effort’ on the part of landowners (i.e. ‘unearned increment’) and therefore ‘should’ be taxed; that such taxation would not reduce the supply of development land; and that tax would be easy to collect because land (unlike other assets and incomes) is fixed and cannot be hidden. 

As an example of the equity argument William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, suggested  that property rights were a form of stewardship, subordinate to the general interest, and that ‘there is no reason why we should pay certain citizens large sums of money for merely owning the land on which our cities are built (Temple, 1942, p 117).  Similarly, the wartime Uthwatt Committee (Ministry of Works & Planning, 1942) argued that planning control meant that those whose land got consent secured its development value whilst those whose land did not gain consent lost out and that this was inherently unfair. 
 
As well as the ‘unearned increment’ aspect of fairness, equity issues also arise when planning creates and enhances these values – e.g. when the supply of land is restricted putting up the price of housing. Taxation can then compensate those who ‘lose out’ from planning policy by transferring assets from better off land owners to poorer households, consistent with a Rawlsian approach to justice (Rawls, 1971).  Importantly Rawls argues that just outcomes need incentives for those who would help create them, suggesting that land value taxation should retain incentives for landowners and developers to sell land and carry out development.






Taxation principles themselves relate to efficiency and equity (both vertical and horizontal) but also to effective revenue raising, administrative ease and competence.  In this context, the authoritative Mirrlees review of taxation argued that taxes should raise the required revenue, whilst avoiding ‘inevitable’ welfare and efficiency reducing side effects (Mirrlees, 2011, p 21).  Policy should define liability in advance, meet legitimate expectations, be administratively simple and address equity, benefits and ability to pay (Smith, 2015). For these administrative reasons, land and property taxes are amongst the oldest, with the advantage that land is easy to define, impossible to hide and its ownership recorded – at least in most developed countries.

As Mirrlees notes, taxation, to the extent that it changes use, is inherently distortionary, but these distortions can, in some cases, be positive e.g. when tax is being used to secure a more efficient outcome e.g. to correct an externality or to pay for public goods.   In these cases, there is the potential to improve outcomes at the same time as increasing efficiency (Whitehead, 2017).  
 
Hypothecation (spending receipts on predefined projects) is more controversial. Some argue that earmarking taxes for specific purposes is a discredited idea (Giles, 2018) even though it is now gaining support in the UK as a means of making tax increases more palatable and spending revenues more transparent. Hypothecation is generally opposed by taxation experts. Mirrlees thought it unlikely that the optimal amount to spend on a programme was matched by the optimal amount raised. Moreover, because tax income may be volatile this creates risks for spending and it was thus unwise to make spending contingent on a specific link to tax (Mirrlees, 2011, Chapter 13).





Since the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, the UK system of land specific taxation has been based on capturing part or all of the increase in land value at the time that planning permission is granted.  The increase in value takes account of (i) the benefits specific to the development following from that planning permission (ii) the benefits from both past and projected economic growth which will enhance this value as well as (iii) existing infrastructure and expectations about future infrastructure investment or other improvements affecting the profitability of the development.  

There are four distinct issues to be addressed when trying to capture development value. 

(i) How should increases be captured through taxation?  

The main approaches which the UK has used at different times include: 
	taxing the increased value within the national tax framework at rates that reflect both political attitudes to ‘unearned increments’ as well as the practicalities of correctly assessing the added value and the incentives necessary for landowners to bring their land forward for development;
	a related approach, where the public sector purchases land at or near existing use value, undertakes or enables the investment necessary for development to take place and captures the resultant development value simply as a result of land ownership;
	a very different approach that gives local planning authorities powers to make charges that can be used to mitigate the adverse direct impacts of development where there is a ‘rational nexus’ between the development and these impacts. The revenues must be used to provide local infrastructure to offset these impacts. Over time this has been extended to include investment making the development acceptable ‘in planning terms’ without making the development itself non-viable;  
	latterly, enabling authorities to levy tariffs at local or regional level to fund necessary infrastructure both to mitigate the negative impacts of development and enhance future economic growth and community welfare.

These approaches are based on four quite different rationales: 
(i) the first is, at least in principle, based simply on the view that ‘unearned increments’ should be taxed; 
(ii) the second also reduces unearned increments but through change in ownership but in addition hypothecates funds for infrastructure investment; 
(iii) the third addresses the impact on local communities of new development, initially narrowly defined in terms of immediate costs but over time including much wider ranging investments that help make the decision more acceptable in planning terms; and 
(iv) the fourth provides an opportunity to raise revenues to pay for capital investments which will benefit a broader constituency including landowners (through increases to their land values), households and indeed all economic activity in the area affected. 

(ii) Who should benefit from the value captured?

Past national land taxes have simply been treated as general tax income so benefit the population as a whole. The second approach whereby public bodies buy development land net of the national tax and keep the incremental values benefits the acquiring agency and localities where the proceeds are spent.  The third and fourth approaches, where land value is captured in cash or in kind through planning obligations or tariffs generate benefits for the immediate locality and/or the wider community including compensating those who are adversely affected by development and providing infrastructure to specific groups, the community or indeed region more widely. 

(iii) How to value what is to be captured?

Here the flexible and discretionary nature of the English planning system is important and contrasts with the zoning system in other countries where changing plans tend to determine changing land values (Booth, 2003). In England plans indicate but do not prescribe, enabling planning authorities to respond to changing circumstance.  Thus there is considerable uncertainty about what might be permitted - and hence what the development value might be. Once full permission is granted the development value crystallises and can therefore be effectively taxed. Even so there is always the possibility that some of the increases in value arising from the permission may have been foreseen and therefore built into the pre-permission value resulting in an undervaluation of development value.  Remaining uncertainties may limit what people are prepared to pay and therefore reduce the measured development value. 

(iv) How do other taxes affect development value tax?

There are other taxes levied on land owners which affect their overall rate of return and therefore what development value is available to tax. Capital gains tax and stamp duty land tax are levied on all capital transactions, including land and property. These will only be immediately relevant if the development or land is to be sold on but their existence affects measured values. Local annual taxation, in the form of business rates and council tax, also impacts on returns. In the case of council tax, the relationship of the tax base to increases in value is extremely limited, while in the case of business activity, increases are in principle captured through changing valuations and therefore higher tax levels.  

5.	Taxing development values and outcomes in England





INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE


There have been three formal attempts directly to capture development value through national taxation. These all taxed development value, with the revenues going almost entirely to the public purse. There was related legislation on compulsory purchase and compensation. All attempts were implemented by Labour governments and all repealed relatively quickly.  Importantly, as Table 1 shows, they all raised very little money. All three schemes kept land off the market and there was limited public acquisition to counter this, let alone the capacity to land bank to help shape future development patterns. 

The lack of success arose from five main factors: 

	the geographically invariant and high national taxes deterred landowners from bringing land forward; 
	there were problems assessing development value and ensuring liabilities were paid;
	developers structured developments to minimise liabilities;
	public land acquisition was required to comply with Local Plans but because these were out of date, these powers could not be used to build up land banks and counter land withholding;
	landowners held on to land because opposition parties were committed to repealing the tax if returned to government.






The idea of using the planning system, rather than taxation, to capture development value through requiring developers to pay for the infrastructure costs of their developments was originally initiated by local planning authorities. However, it became an increasing part of central government policy after the late 1980s. Formal national legislation was consolidated in S106 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1990. This allowed local planning authorities to negotiate obligations in the form of contributions from developers (in cash and kind) towards the infrastructure and community facilities needed to support new development. These are implemented through enforceable private contracts between planning authorities and developers. Contributions had to be justified on a ‘rational nexus basis’, i.e. the new development must ‘cause’ the need for specific infrastructure and the obligations must be related in scale and type to the proposed development.  As well as securing infrastructure they also make proposed developments acceptable in planning terms, such as the provision of affordable housing.  Since 2010 local planning authorities have also had powers to implement a Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) as a fixed charge on all types of development with the intention that every type of development contributes to the funding of sub regional infrastructure. When CIL was introduced, planning obligations were restricted to site-specific infrastructure (widely defined) and affordable housing. CIL takes precedence over s106, so affordable housing may be squeezed out. Also unlike obligations, there is no contractual link between charges and specific infrastructure projects.


Table 1 shows that planning obligations, in contrast to national taxation measures, have proved relatively successful in raising cash and in kind contributions.  The majority have been secured in London and SE England, a reflection of the geographical pattern of land values as well as development. Obligations are largely delivered, with non-delivery arising mainly from changes to proposed developments or schemes not proceeding at all. 
   
As long as developers fund contributions by paying less for land, obligations become a de facto tax on development value borne by the landowner, locally negotiated and ‘hypothecated’ for local needs – in effect a hybrid charge and tax. If this is the case, obligations should have no negative impact would generally be regarded as improving on efficiency and equity. In practice however there will be some impact on what comes forward and what is built (for example smaller homes at higher densities) – so there are efficiency distortions.  
 Landowners generally pay a higher proportion when planning authorities’ obligations policies are clearly set out in their Local Plans and consistently implemented and when national developers are seeking consent and acquiring land under options agreements. When authorities’ policies are less clear or more inexperienced, often smaller, builders are involved the outcome may be different. When grant funding for the affordable housing element is available, housing associations may pay higher prices for affordable homes built by developers (compared with a zero grant position) so that higher land prices result and the de facto tax is reduced.  Who pays then depends on negotiations over contributions. All these complexities mean that the proportion of ‘available’ development value that is finally captured, and therefore the amount the landowner is ‘taxed’, is extremely varied.  We estimate that planning obligations plus national transactions taxes take on average perhaps a half of greenfield sites’ open market values unfettered by obligations. (Crook et al, 2018b)

There are five reasons why obligations have succeeded better than earlier approaches:
	unlike national taxes, obligations started as a ‘bottom up’ policy led by local authorities, although later endorsed by national policy; 
	the English courts have permitted a wide range of obligations provided they make proposed developments acceptable in planning terms;
	obligations are negotiated on a site by site basis, allowing specifics of the site and of its impact to be taken into account when negotiating land prices and determining viability;
	obligations have the character of a hypothecated tax because contributions are spent locally; and
	because obligations are enforceable private contracts local authorities have confidence in developers delivering them and developers have confidence that the infrastructure they pay for will be delivered.

As we noted in our evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee (Crook et al, 2018a), which we based on our continuing research, planning obligations have at least four significant limitations: 

First, they are dependent on the market. When market conditions are positive developers are keen to offer obligations to speed up consent; when market conditions worsen they either abandon developments or try to renegotiate obligations downward. After the global financial crisis there were concerns about sites being stalled in part because of onerous obligations. In 2013 developers were given rights to seek renegotiation earlier than hitherto. The evidence (McAllister et al, 2016; University of Reading et al, 2014) suggested many reasons for developers taking up this right, some of which were the result of already negotiated obligations making projects unviable while others related to falling land costs which affected their balance sheets or simply the fact that new right made it easier to re-negotiate contributions.

Second, the system can generate perverse incentives to planners, in that if they impose greater constraints on land supply, potential contributions increase. Equally, the authority may choose to enable higher densities generating higher land values and potential contributions, benefitting both the authority and the developer, but also sometimes socially undesirable outcomes. 

Third, negotiations take time and there is often a good deal of asymmetry in the skills and capacities between planning authorities and developers, resulting in slow negotiations and uncertain outcomes (McAllister et al, 2016).  Partly to address this, many planning authorities have introduced some tariff-like fixed standard charges (e.g. a charge per sq m of floorspace towards open space). 

Fourth, whilst most large residential sites have agreed obligations, this is not the case for smaller sites or commercial sites where except for large retail developments few have agreements. This partial coverage distorts what is developed. Equally the fact that permitted development (such as the conversion of offices to housing) is not subject to obligations   distorts the development mix and reduces the amount of affordable housing achievable.
. 
Other limitations arise from the wide variations in planning authorities’ obligations policies and practice (creating uncertainty for developers operating across authorities).  These variations appear to arise from differences in the culture and behaviour of planning authorities and are not strongly related to market circumstances or indeed local needs (Crook et al, 2016; Dunning, et al, this issue).  This suggests that more could be negotiated and delivered within a more consistent framework. Reliance on flawed residual valuation models to evaluate viability, especially in relation to ‘benchmark land values’, also appears to have reduced what is achieved through obligations compared with using more robust models (Coleman et al, 2012; Crosby et al, 2013; Henneberry in Crook et al, 2016; McAllister et al, this volume).

The 2014 revisions to the National Planning Policy Framework (which stressed that negotiated planning obligations should not undermine viability) appear to have led to developers especially in London paying land prices which cannot be sustained given the required obligations and then seeking to reduce the affordable housing element. Successful renegotiations have then reinforced their preparedness to offer more for the land (Sayce et al, 2017). The recent High Court decision on the Parkhurst development in Islington (which stated that overpayment in relation to Local Plan requirements could not be a reason for downward renegotiation) could well be an important judgement helping to reverse this behaviour​[2]​  (see also Crosby, this issue).

Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL)

CIL has added new complexities.  It has been adopted mainly by planning authorities in high demand areas especially London. In low demand areas viability concerns mean it has rarely been adopted, in part because the fixed charge can reduce the development value ‘left over’ for affordable housing which continues to be a priority for many authorities.  Because of this patchwork of adopting and non-adopting authorities many small developments in the latter authorities are making no contributions to infrastructure even though they could afford to do so.  And where it has been adopted it has proved more complex, uncertain and time consuming than first anticipated. Also significant exemptions have been introduced reducing the proportion of development potentially contributing to CIL. For these and other reasons, less has been collected than initially anticipated (Community Infrastructure Levy Review Group, 2016; Lord et al, 2018; University of Reading et al, 2017). It is now also regarded as more uncertain than s106 because of rates often change and because CIL is a charge not a contract, the timing or indeed the provision of identified infrastructure provision is unclear.





The assumption of the simplest models, whether national or local, is that there will be no negative impact on efficiency, depends on there being no changes in development decisions made. In reality there are always both the possibility and incentives to change decisions about what is delivered and about bringing forward land for development. 

In the national tax context there are no incentives to reduce external costs (including congestion on consumer services) or other market failures or to provide public goods – it is just a tax. 





Equity through national taxation is achieved by taxing landowners on the ‘unearned increment’ and thus increasing overall government revenue. How and where these revenues are spent is entirely a matter for national government.  Some of the costs may fall on other actors, notably developers and households and those who suffer from the negative effects of development but who are not compensated.  Because higher tax rates reduce incentives to sell land, this may also breach a Rawlsian principles of social justice, i.e. that those who produce the goods needed in a socially just society must have incentives to do so. 









Planning obligations have secured far more revenue than national taxes.  Unlike national taxation of development value, obligations’ receipts are ‘hypothecated’ for planning related local need and to offset costs to the community of the development. Contractual enforceability means there is more certainty about what is delivered as long as the development takes place.  Obligations have not been able to maximise potential revenue partly because many local authorities do not use the powers as effectively as they could and because there is a great deal of wastage in the process. Where they are used, viability negotiations may limit the take because of both inherent uncertainty and the relative power between authorities and developers. 

While national land value taxes can in principle be efficient they clearly have distorted decisions in particular by holding land off the market or changing the timing of development. Obligations can also be used efficiently if they lie within (probably well within) the development value arising from planning permission. However, there is clear evidence of inefficiencies in that they modify decisions particularly in relation to density and dwelling type and tenure as well as affecting viability. 

Obligations breach ‘horizontal equity’ as not all benefitting from planning consents contribute (e.g. small sites) and not all affected by development are compensated by the provision of new local infrastructure.  Although CIL was an attempt to ensure all development contributed, the many exceptions and exemptions undermine potential horizontal equity. Because policies and practices are a discretionary matter for each local planning authority, there are big variations in outcomes between local authority areas with similar economic environments. There is also a broader structural issue that the amounts achievable relate to the extent of market demand. Areas with lower demand have fewer opportunities but may have similar or even greater needs.  

As far as administrative transparency and simplicity is concerned the evidence with respect to national taxation is extremely negative – and supplemented by the fact that it was later felt infeasible even to introduce a Planning Gain Supplement as proposed by Barker (Crook et al 2016).. 





Are there better ways of capturing development values within the current system?

How can we improve the system? An important starting point is almost certainly incremental change by using and amending what works rather than starting from scratch (House of Commons, 2018; Travers and Whitehead, forthcoming). 

There are a number of modifications already under discussion which could help promote more efficiency, equity and greater adherence to taxation principles.  Although making viability judgements subject to Plan policies, not on the circumstances of each site, (MHCLG, 2018a) risks deterring development if sites do not match plan wide criteria, the recent Parkhurst judgement (see above) should secure more revenue and comply more with horizontal equity in taxation. Proposed changes (MHCLG, 2018b) allowing more pooling of planning obligations revenue and permitting inter-authority CIL like levies should improve efficiency by enabling more off-site infrastructure to be delivered. Other proposals may speed up processes and improve transparency but the decision not to remove exemptions to CIL will continue to limit what can be secured and breach the principle of horizontal equity.

There is a growing emphasis on large-scale development including ‘mini’ new towns/villages and urban extensions. The government has already introduced regulations to enable local authority led New Town Development Corporations (MHCLG, 2018c). The Letwin Review (Letwin, 2018) goes further proposing that all large sites identified in Local Plans would be designated as fully privately funded Infrastructure Development Corporations. Their Master Plans would specify a diversity of housing tenures as well as (where viable) high proportions of affordable housing and infrastructure investment– so the land values in high demand areas would be reduced very significantly (to a maximum of ten times existing use value). The general recommendation has been explicitly endorsed by the government, stating that housing diversification should be funded through reductions in residual land values (Secretary of State for MHCLG, 2019).

Although there is obvious merit in retaining the principle of negotiated planning obligations, securing greater revenues requires greater clarity of policy, increased speed of negotiation, and acceptance that more robust approaches need to be put in place to address viability issues in volatile markets. A core issue here is the central role to be played by the Local Plan in the effective delivery of development through generating a more certain environment for negotiation. The system might also include thresholds (as are being used in London for affordable housing) giving those prepared to meet defined requirements speedier planning permission. 

Although currently not favoured by government, a complementary reform would be to adopt the Peace review proposals for CIL (Community Infrastructure Levy Review Group, 2016) of putting in place a light nationally determined fixed tariff for all types of development, removing current exceptions and exemptions and generating revenue across the country.  However, in lower demand areas it might, even if kept low, negatively impact on development activity. A somewhat  different approach, more in line with current government thinking (MHGLG, 2018b), would be to require that a CIL-like tariff be introduced in all authorities but with local discretion to set rates in relation to the local economic environment – including a zero rate where absolutely necessary. To be effective however the current uncertainty problems associated with CIL (both rates and the timing of infrastructure investment) would have to be addressed. Negotiated planning obligations would still remain both to ensure affordable housing and for complex larger sites particularly where the impact of the development extends outside the immediate neighbourhood of the development. 

Many of these suggestions have been tried in London and their use continues to raise fundamental issues about the trade-off between raising funds and ensuring viability. Even in London, development value is not a never ending stream to be used multiple times.  Such over-optimism can rapidly reduce both developer and landowner incentives. In other regions the amount that can be raised, even with a much more effective collection mechanism, will often fall well short of what is required to support required infrastructure investment.

Broadening the tax base

The most important point to reiterate here is what we said about the current system in our Introduction to this paper: that government has concentrated on the taxation of development value to the exclusion of other land and properties taxes that can capture increases in value arising from infrastructure and more generally from economic growth (Travers and Whitehead, forthcoming). The fact that taxation is concentrated on new development and indeed in particular regions distorts investment decisions and negatively impacts on innovation, productivity and future incomes.  

Any broader based reform would need to take into account the full range of property taxes now in place. In this context OECD analysis suggests that the UK has the highest property tax take as a proportion of both GDP and total taxation. Moreover, around 50 percent of the take comes from residential property and the tax on residential property is above the OECD average for all property taxation (OECD, 2018).  However, a much higher proportion than in other countries goes directly to central government rather than to support local government expenditures as in most other countries. Moreover, the system is highly distortionary at national level, in that taxes are only levied on transactions, capital gains tax is too easily avoided and stamp duty land tax is significantly limiting mobility and thus productivity.  

The property tax system is particularly ineffective in the local context, because of exemptions which distort land use choices and reduce revenues; a council tax system which is unresponsive to changes in either capital and rental values; and a business rating system which, while technically linked to rental values, suffers from irregular revaluations and assessments often poorly related to the rent actually paid (House of Commons, 2019). Overall, the system is seen to be highly inefficient by theorists and practitioners alike (e.g. Mirrlees, 2011; IMF, 2018; House of Commons, 2018; Travers and Whitehead, forthcoming). 

Measures that merit consideration include an annual land value or property tax which would be updated to include price increases associated with infrastructure and development as well as more general productivity increases - or it could be a tax solely on incremental increases (although then beware decreases). This type of tax is exemplified in Denmark where it has historically proved reasonably successful (Kleven, 2014). 

More in line with the overall approach to taxation in the UK would be: (i) to modify capital gains tax to remove the exemption on primary residences and to make it less of a ‘voluntary’ tax.  This would have the benefit of addressing all value uplift but only at the point of transaction; (ii) to heavily reduce or remove stamp duty which is a highly distortionary tax on economic activity; and (iii) to reform the council tax system so that it better reflects capital values/rents and putting in place mandatory updated valuations.

The current tax system provides a great deal of revenue to national government. If carefully structured, it could both provide higher and more responsive income streams for government at the same time as making it more equitable in relation to income and housing wealth.  The benefits of shifting towards a much broader and more coherent tax base also significantly lie in improving efficiency and thus increasing productivity and growth.  However, fundamental reform carries with it valuation, administrative and particularly political challenges which, as history has shown, make it difficult if not impossible to implement. 
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^1	  There are more general taxes on transactions in assets as well as local business rates and council tax (discussed later). There is also no land specific taxation of land values – as opposed to land value increases – but this issue lies outside our current remit.  
^2	  Parkhurst Road Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and another [2018] EWHC 991 (Admin)
